Due to information asymmetry problem in financial markets good quality firms often find it difficult to prove to external finance providers about their true quality and to distinguish themselves from bad quality firms. We argue that instead of sending indirect signals to financial market good quality firms could focus on improving their productivity to obtain external finance. Besides relying solely on firms' balance sheet information external finance providers using firms' TFP or labour productivity information would have a more reliable indication of firms' quality and risk. Overall, using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between 2003-2016 we find that productivity measured by TFP or labour productivity is statistically and economically important and positive in determining firms' external finance, i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long term debt. We find that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but only some weak results for total leverage and long term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firm sample. We also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better use of their productivity to gain external finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms and nonexporting firms. The causality of the regression results is also confirmed by difference-indifference tests using an exogenous industrial policy shock.
Introduction
It is well recognised that financial market imperfections result in good quality firms being unable to raise external funds for their profitable projects. There has been extensive research that focus on firms' financing behaviour under the assumption that firms are adversely affected by financial market imperfections. Research studies have also been investigating how legal and institutional advancement may improve the market imperfection situation and consequently improve the accessibility of external finance for all firms in the market (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Ӧztekin and Flannery, 2012) . Anecdotal evidence seems to show that financial institutions tend to base their lending decisions on bank relations or firms' balance sheet information, which is subject to window dressing. Tan et al. (2014) does find evidence that non-state Chinese listed firms manipulate their earnings to meet the performance targets required by the stock market in order to raise equity finance. Therefore, external financial resources do not necessarily go to the truly good quality firms. However, little is known about how heterogeneous firms can distinguish themselves from others and prove to external finance providers about their true worthiness 1 , and therefore suffer less from the information asymmetry problem under given institutional environment. In other words, little is known about whether truly good firms do get external finance.
In recent years, the relationship between firms' productivity and their finance has attracted increasing attention among scholars for most major economies, e.g. Chen and Guariglia (2013) for China, Krishnan et al. (2015) for the US, Ferrando and Ruggieri (2018) for Euro area countries. Most recently, Egger and Keuschnigg (2017) 's model shows that banks are only willing to lend to firms with a minimum productivity level, which will enable firms to thrive in the market and allow banks to break even from the lending. Neuhann and Saidi (2018) find from US public firms that with better informational economy of scale, i.e. more information about firms became available to banks, following the deregulation of universal banks (which conduct both commercial and investment bank businesses), universal banks finance riskier but more productive firms. However, none of these papers have tested directly whether high productivity itself would help firms to be more attractive to banks to get loans.
This paper aims to further contribute to the empirical research on firms' financing behaviour that have been published in this journal, see for example, Crespí and Martín-Oliver (2015) , Vanacker et al. (2014) among others. In our study we explore how firms' productivity, which is measured by either total factor productivity (TFP) or labour productivity, can be used as a relevant indicator of firms' true value and helps firms to raise external finance. In doing so, we use Chinese listed manufacturing firms' data.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to test whether productivity helps firms to raise external finance, and whether better firms do get relatively more external finance.
Consequently, we may be able to identify productivity as a good indicator of firms' quality from the perspective of external finance providers. A reliable indicator of firms' quality may help to overcome information asymmetry problem in the financial markets to some extent and channel external finance into good quality firms. Our research effectually also contributes to the firm capital structure literature, which often debates about what drives firms' financing choices. We offer an alternative view. Rather than being a choice of firms due to cost minimisation as suggested by the pecking order theories, static trade off theories and market timing theories, our research would imply that firms' capital structure is also determined by their ability of raising external finance and/or in any particular form of external finance from outsiders. In other words, our results would show that firms' capital structure is not only determined by what firms want, but also what they are able to have.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant theories and describes our theoretical idea. Section 3 presents the equations for empirical tests and discusses our method. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 discusses the regression results. Section 6 further verify the causality of our results, and finally section 7 concludes.
Literature and our contributions

Productivity and finance
There has been an increasing interest in the relationship between productivity and finance. Gatti and Love (2008) , Moreno-Badia and Slootmaekers (2009) , Chen and Guariglia (2013) , Krishnan et al. (2015) , Ferrando and Ruggieri (2018) among others find evidence of the link between firms' finance and productivity, as finance may enable firms to optimise operations and carry out productivity enhancing investments. There is also limited research on the reverse link. Besides Egger and Keuschnigg (2017) and Neuhann and Saidi (2018) mentioned above, Gonzalez and James (2007) using a panel of US listed firms shows that technology firms have easier access to bank lending, and current earnings and cash flows are significantly less important in determining such finance for technology firms than for non-technology firms. It is not unreasonable to interpret their results as that technology, a likely proxy for productivity, has a positive effect on firms' access to bank lending. However, none of these researches has provided any direct evidence whether productivity helps with firms' external finance. Inspired mainly by Egger and Keuschnigg (2017) and Neuhann and Saidi (2018) , which find that banks are willing to lend to productive firms even if they are riskier, and to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to directly test the effects of productivity on firms' ability of raising external finance, which is also our foremost contribution.
Given that productivity fundamentally defines heterogeneity across firms (e.g. Melitz, 2003) , our key novel idea is that in a competitive market where firms maximise profits and external finance providers are risk neutral or averse, firms which do not reach a critical level of productivity have to exit the market. Firms with intermediate level of productivity are able to survive in the market, but can only rely on their own internal finance, because they are rationed by external finance providers who disbelieve their ability in generating sufficient cash flow and find them too risky to lend to or invest in. Firms with high level of productivity not only grow in the market, but also have access to external financial markets, where finance providers find them trustworthy. This idea is illustrated in figure 1 , where p * and p e are the critical productivity levels when firms can survive and start to access external finance respectively.
This model shows that exposure to imperfect financial markets induces only the most productive firms to access external finance while simultaneously forcing the least productive firms to exit. Both the exit of the least productive firms and the additional investment that the most productive firms are able to undertake using the external finance, reallocate market shares towards the more productive firms, and eventually promote an aggregate productivity increase.
Our model has the empirical implication that firms' productivity should have a positive effect on their ability in raising external funds through mitigating information asymmetry problem.
Accordingly, if firms have demand of external finance for their investment opportunities, we should observe that higher productivity helps firms to keep higher leverage, keep higher debt ratio, and issue more new equity (or some combination of them).
Our model is also consistent with the findings in the finance and growth literature at both aggregate (e.g. Beck, et al. 2000; Carlin and Mayer, 2003) and firm levels (e.g. Guariglia et al., 2011) , where a sound financial system or good accessibility of financial resources is found to enable growth (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; Ayyagari, et al., 2011) . Productivity drives growth through its direct effects such as effort and efficiency. Our model links the two together, i.e. it suggests that productivity could also drive growth indirectly through enabling external finance.
The model may also find some support from the signalling theory developed by Ross (1977) , which suggests that managers have the incentive to signal the market of firms' high quality by choosing high leverage, as issuing debt can expose firms to costly financial distress (Ovtchinnikov, 2010) . Though Ross's model and ours suggest similar relationship between firms' quality and leverage, Ross models leverage as a choice of firms whereas we consider that firms are eager to demonstrate their qualities in order to compete for external finance. In his theory the incentive for signalling is primarily managers' personal gains, whereas we consider that the incentive for firms to prove their true quality is to obtain external finance. Yet in the signalling theory, quality is not defined in terms of observable variables (Smith and Watts, 1992 ), whereas we specify quality as firms' productivity.
A new role for productivity in capital structure
To formally test the effects of productivity on firms' external finance, we start our empirical model from the established firm capital structure literature. The main ones predicting the observed behaviour of utilising external finance by a value-maximising firm include the Myers and Majluf (1984)'s pecking order theory, the static trade-off theory and the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) . Also due to managerial optimism (Heaton, 2002) whether firms accept positive net present value projects may depend on whether the projects require external finance. Such financing decisions are only related to firms' free cash flow and not influenced by asymmetric information and rational agency costs (Heaton, 2002) . According to the agency theory, firms' capital structure is likely an optimal response of partially entrenched and risk-neutral managers who balance between overinvestment and the risk of takeovers (Zwiebel, 1996 ). Morellec's (2004) real option model also shows capital structure as riskneutral managers' choice between investment and retaining control. Mande et al. (2011) argue that good corporate governance reduces firms' agency costs and consequently increases firms' likelihood of issuing equity finance. Crespí and Martín-Oliver (2015) also argue the reason that family firms have easier access to debt than nonfamily firms is due to their lower agency cost.
The empirical evidence of those theories has been inconclusive (e.g. Fama and French, 2002; Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2003) . It is possibly attributable to statistical testing difficulties and the practical interpretation of those hypotheses (e.g. Leary and Roberts, 2010) and seem to depend on the particular stochastic process assumed for firms' earnings, i.e. internal source of finance (Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003) . The magnitude and persistency of the impact of market timing on capital structure are also challenged by some empirical findings, such as Alti (2006) , and Hovakimian (2006) . There is also evidence that firms often actually issue debt and equity simultaneously to reduce variation in their capital structure (e.g. Billinsley et al., 1994) .
Therefore, our second contribution is that we show that besides those factors suggested by past research, firms' productivity demonstrates firms' true value and therefore helps firms to raise external finance through the channel of mitigating information asymmetry. Our model would be more consistent with the pecking order theory, i.e. we confirm that more productive firms are able to utilise finance of higher pecking order or more expensive external finance.
Financial institutions may be attempted to use firm's balance sheet information, such as profitability, financial health, previous loan payment history, as market signal of credit worthiness and to determine the eligibility of a firm for access to loans, since these information can be easily monitored (see Brealey et al., 1977; Fama, 1984) . However, balance sheet information, on the other hand, is easily manipulated and often cannot convince outsiders about the true value of a firm (Tan et al., 2014) . Institutions and firms relying on accounting information are deemed to suffer from information asymmetry problem. We argue that productivity, especially TFP, is a good indicator of firms' true worthiness and cannot be easily manipulated. It helps firms to suffer less from information asymmetry problem in the financial markets. Therefore, we want to find out whether productive firms do get more external finance and in what forms of finance. To our knowledge, the existing research in the areas of firms' capital structure mainly focuses on testing firms' financing behaviour given the disadvantages of information asymmetries and agency problems etc., but surprisingly little is known on whether and how firms can relieve such disadvantage themselves so that they can optimise their financing and production strategy.
A stream of research finds that legal and institutional improvement in a country can benefit the country's financial development and accessibility for borrowers overall (e.g. Beck et al., 2003) . Vanacker et al. (2014) find better shareholder protection and bankruptcy laws help new technology-based firms in six European countries to gain better probability to access and have more amount of equity and debt finance. However, these authors' focus is on macro environment rather than individual firms. Our paper aims to fill in this gap in the literature.
Why China
Our third contribution is to use Chinese listed manufacturing firm data, which provide a good testing environment. Chinese firms have experienced an enormous productivity growth and the country has transformed from a virtually closed economy to a world manufacturing centre in just three decades. Yet its financial sector is largely underdeveloped. The Chinese stock market started in 1990, and only became more regulated from 1999, when the China Securities Acts was put into effect. Firms in China are known to face difficulty in raising finance (e.g. Allen et al., 2005; Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011) . Hence, it is interesting to test whether higher productivity brings more external finance to listed Chinese firms, which are likely to have relatively better quality than other non-listed firms and already have the access to equity finance. The implications found from listed firms can be easily extended to other firms, as the latter would typically suffer more from information asymmetries.
The model and estimation methods
The main model
Except firms' productivity, the variables in our main regression equation have been well documented in the capital structure literature in determining firms' external finance. The regression models take the following form extfinanceit = a + b1extfinancei,t-1 + b2salesit-1 + b3assetgrowthit-1 + b4tangibilityit-1 + b5roait-1 + b6depit-1 + b7productivityit-1 + vj + vt + vp + vo + eit (1) The extfinance variables, including firm i's total leverage, i.e. the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, new issue of equity to total assets ratio 2 , and long term debt to total assets ratio at time t, are used in separate regressions. We use the same model to compare the effects of productivity on three forms of external finance. sales is the logarithm of firm's real sales;
assetgrowth is the growth of firm's net fixed assets in logarithm form from time t-1 to time t; tangibility is firm's ratio of total tangible assets to total assets; roa is firm's return on assets, which is the ratio of net profit to total assets; dep is firm's depreciation to total assets ratio; Though TFP is believed to be a good measure of manufacturing firms' productivity (see Syverson 2011 for a survey), it is not easily observable or comparable by external finance providers. Therefore, we also test eq. (1) using labour productivity, which provides a further check of the robustness of our findings.
Direct bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977) and borrowing costs associated with information asymmetries in the financial markets (Ferri and Jones, 1979; Titman and Wessels, 1988 ) mean that it is easier for large firms to borrow, i.e. to keep high leverage. However, on the other hand, firms with large sales will have more retained earnings, which is a cheap internal source of finance, have less need of external finance. We use firms' real sales to proxy firm size and expect it to have either positive or negative coefficient.
The inclusion of firms' net fixed asset growth is to capture firms' growth opportunities.
The relationship between firms' growth opportunities and leverage may vary. High growth opportunities may lead to worse shareholder-bondholder conflict (Myers, 1977) , and assets substitution and dilution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Therefore, firms reduce leverage as a response to control the costs associated with these problems. Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that expected future growth should be negatively related to long-term debt level due to agency cost. However, the agency problem is mitigated if firms issue short-term debt (Myers, 1977) .
Under the pecking order theory, if firms' priority is current period investment, firms' leverage will increase with higher growth opportunities, as firms would finance the current investment projects with increased debt (Ovtchinnikov, 2010) . However, if firms are more concerned with future investment, they would prefer to keep current leverage low and reserve their debt capacity in anticipation of future finance for investment (Ovtchinnikov, 2010) . Using a dynamic model of investment and financing, Sundaresan et al. (2015) also show that a rational firm significantly lowers its leverage in anticipation of future growth. Thus, the sign of the asset growth variable in our model may is uncertain.
Tangible assets can be used as collateral by lenders and thus firms' opportunity to engage in asset substitution is reduced (Stulz and Johnson, 1985) , which eases the agency problem. This suggests a likely positive effect of assets tangibility on leverage. However, when firms' leverage is not too high, managers may tend to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites, which suggests a negative relation between collateralisable (tangible) capital and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988) . Hence, the sign of tangibility variable may be also uncertain. We also expect the effect of tangibility on firms' equity finance would be uncertain too. Investors can claim firm's remaining assets after lenders in case of bankruptcy. On the other hand, investors may prefer firms to have low tangibility so that more funds may be freed up for profitable investment, which benefit shareholders more directly than debtholders.
Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure firms' profitability. According to the pecking order theory, profitable firms would have less need to finance investment projects with more expensive external finance, and thus have lower leverage. Profitable firms may also use internal finance to repurchase outstanding equity when their share price is low according to market timing theory, and have less need of issuing new equity. On the other hand, under the trade-off theory more profitable firms have lower potential costs of financial distress, and thus can utilise more debt to shield against income tax and control the agency cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) . Thus, debt is more attractive and affordable for more profitable firms, i.e.
leverage is higher. The overall effect of profitability depends on which incentive dominates.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest that firms' depreciation is a corporate tax shield substitute for debt. If firms utilise their depreciation deductions to shield corporate tax, firms may not try to use debt for the same purpose given concerns of financial distress risk. This follows the logic of the trade-off theory. Therefore, we may expect a negative relationship between depreciation and leverage. Huang and Song (2006) find a negative relation between such tax shield and the leverage of Chinese listed firms. However, the effect of depreciation on firms' new equity might be opposite. High depreciation leads to high cost in firms' income statement, which leads to lower net income and lower retained earnings. According to the market timing theory, when firms are short in their internal source of finance, they have stronger incentives to issue new equity. Therefore, we may expect a positive effect of depreciation on firms' new equity.
Industry and time dummies are common in the literature to control for industry specific characteristics and time effects. There has been numerous empirical evidence of cross-sectional differences in firms' capital structure related to industrial effects (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988) , and positive relation between firms' capital structure and the average of their industry (e.g. Bradley et al., 1984) . The province dummies are to control the fixed effect associated with firm location. The Chinese economy has a strong location dimension, where typically the coastal provinces have more advanced economies than others do. Provincial authorities have numerous local policies that shape the economic and legal environment for firms.
Ownership dummies 5 account for various managerial incentives that may affect firms' capital structure especially in the Chinese context. For example, it is often believed that state firms have easier access to external finance due to the fact that in the event of bankruptcy state firms are likely to be bailed out by public finance. Foreign firms often have access to finance abroad such as funds from their parent companies and foreign financial institutions, whereas private firms in China are discriminated in financial markets (Allen et al., 2005) . The Chinese stock market started with only state firms in the early 1990s, and the state firms dominated the market for many years. As the privatisation process goes on, both the proportion of state firms in the stock market and the proportion of state shares in firms keep reducing. In our sample, the proportion of state firms drops each year from over 60% in 2003 to about 30% in 2016. To further eliminate the influence of financial privileges that firms with some ownership types may enjoy, we also test eq. (1) with domestic private firm sample only. If our results are also valid for the most disadvantaged group of domestic private firms, we may be more confident that the productivity effects are not driven by some firms' ownership privilege in obtaining external finance.
We then further split the full sample of firm-years by their size and age together, and their export status by estimating eq. (2). Type1 is a dummy variable indicating firms being small and young 6 in industry j and year t, and exporting products overseas in year t in separate regressions. Beck et al. (2006) find strong evidence from a large panel of firms from 80 countries that size and age are useful indicators of financing constraints. Casey and O'Toole (2014) also find from Euro area counties that size and age influence firms accessibility of different types of finance,
i.e. larger and older firms are more likely to use finance of higher pecking order. Thus, we try to find out whether productivity is more helpful for small young firms or for larger and/or older firms.
Only productive firms are able to export due to the large sunk cost of exporting (Melitz, 2003) . Therefore, export status could be a natural indicator of firms' quality. Less financial constraints or more availability of finance enables export as well (see Wagner 2014 for early survey, and Muûls, 2015 among others). The export, productivity and finance nexus has also been an increasingly popular research area recently, e.g. Egger and Keuschnigg (2017) . We are the first trying to explore further by testing whether exporters with high productivity get more external finance. Both size age and exporting status dimensions somewhat indicate firms'
perceived or true quality. We are interested to find out how firms' productivity interact with these measures and exert any effect on their ability of increasing external finance.
Estimation methods
Our regression models are likely to suffer from endogeneity problems, and we therefore lag all the independent variables by one period to treat the problem. We further control for the possible simultaneity and endogeneity problems by using the system generalised method of moments (GMM), in which we treat all the regressors as endogenous and instrument them using their own lagged variables. 7 Year dummies, two-digit industry dummies, province dummies and ownership dummies are included in all the regressions and instrument sets. Since finance measures are found to be able to increase firms' TFP (e.g. Chen and Guariglia, 2013) , we cautiously make sure if productivity helps firms to increase their external finance, the effects are not driven simply by the correlations between the two variables. We therefore further establish the casual effect of productivity on external finance by utilising the difference-indifference method following an exogenous industrial policy shock.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data
Our data is from the China stock market financial statements database (CSMAR), which contains financial statement information for all listed firms in China's stock market. Due to accounting standards and stock market regulation changes, and data collection issues, some of our key variables only became available from 2003 8 . Our sample firms are manufacturing firms located in 30 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities of China. 7 We use the lagged level variables of the endogenous regressors in the differenced equations and the lagged difference variables in the level equations as the instruments.
8 Export data appears in various forms for different firms and is extracted from a set of assorted firm level information.
To control for the bias caused by outliers we winsorise the one percent tails of the distribution of all variables included in our regressions except the following. term debt than other firms, which may be due to their inability to borrow, as they are more likely to be discriminated in the Chinese financial market. This is consistent with the pecking order theory, which suggests that under information asymmetries due to the higher costs and uncertainty of long term finance, only high quality firms may be able to obtain external long term finance. Private firms' liquidity and coverage ratio are more than double of those of others, which might show a better financial position of private firms. However, in the meanwhile they could also indicate precautionary internal finance buffer possibly because private firms are 9 See the appendix A.1 for more information on the structure of our panel. 10 Firms' ownerships are defined by their ultimate controlling shareholder.
unable to secure external finance when they need. Overall, private firms seem to perform better and financially heathier, even though they seem to be disadvantaged in obtaining external borrowing. Perhaps due to their high labour intensity, private firms' labour productivity is only marginally higher than others.
Column 5 to 7 compare small young firm-years with the rest. Small young firm-years take up about 24.8% of all firm-years. They are much lower in all three measures of external finance. A quite small proportion of them have long term debt. They are also significantly less productive by all measures of TFP and labour productivity. Their asset growth are highly similar with others. They are much less profitable, have lower depreciation and are more labour intensive. Considering their lower external finance even with higher tangibility, we may suspect that small young firms do have difficulty in obtaining external finance. Small young firms are significantly more liquid, though their coverage ratio is similar with other firms. High liquidity could mean a good internal financial position, but on the other hand, it could also be a result of inability of obtaining external finance and consequently indicates more reliance of internal finance, especially when coupled with lower performance indicators of these firms.
Overall, small young firms seem to have worse quality than others. This important observation may suggest that the information asymmetry problem may be well at work among China's listed manufacturing firms, where small young firms suffer more. We try to explore whether conventional proxies for information asymmetries, i.e. firm size and age, would make a difference for the effects of firm productivity in helping raising external finance.
We also divide our sample firm-years according to whether firms export to overseas markets in a particular year 11 . 57.4% of our sample firm-years export and 42.6% do not. All of our indicators are significantly different between exporters and non-exporters. Exporters have higher leverage and long term debt, but lower new equity. There is a bigger proportion of exporters having positive long term debt than non-exporters. Exporters are generally more productive than non-exporters by three out of four measures of productivity. Their sales size is larger, asset growth almost double of the non-exporters, and their profitability much higher.
Exporters are less tangible on average. Their depreciation is only slightly higher. They also have much higher liquidity and coverage ratio. Overall, exporting manufacturing firms in our F 11 Some of our sample firms do switch between exporters and non-exporters, but it is extremely rare that they changed frequently or dramatically in terms of export sales during the sample period. In order to capture particularly firms' switch from non-exporter to exporter, which is likely due to productivity improvement according to Melitz (2003) , we define firms' export status by year.
sample seem to have better quality, and with better internal financial position, they seem to rely more on equity finance, but do not seem to use more borrowing.
Generally, the descriptive statistics provide some preliminary evidence that higher productivity tend to be associated with higher equity finance, but not necessarily with higher leverage or long term debt. The characteristics of firm ownership, size and age, export status all play a role in influencing firms' external finance. We also notice that in our sample high growth firms tend to have less long term debt, which is in line with Barclay and Smith's (1995) empirical finding that high growth firms prefer to use short term debt.
Results
In this section, we provide a more detailed analysis of the link between productivity and external finance, and the extent to which the characteristics of firm ownership, size and age, and export status affect the sensitivity of three forms of external finance, i.e. total leverage, new equity and long term debt, to productivity, i.e. three measures of TFP as well as labour productivity.
Productivity effects on firms' total leverage
First, in column 1 to 3 of table 2 we estimate eq. (1) with three measures of TFP and total leverage and show the results for the full sample. Only Wooldridge TFP has a significant positive effect on firms' total leverage. In column 4 of table 2 we show the full sample results using labour productivity, which has no effect on firms' leverage. Labour productivity does not measure other aspects of firms' efficiency than the labour input, but it can be easily measured and readily available to external finance providers. However, the simple measurement of labour productivity may bias towards capital-intensive firms. Especially the Chinese export sector is dominated by labour intensive industries, which are better at producing labour intensive goods than non-exporters, but they might not be efficient in terms of other aspects of production.
Therefore, to account for the possible differences of labour intensity when examining the effect of labour productivity, we add a ratio of firms' total wage bill to sales to the labour productivity regressions.
To further eliminate potential influence of firms' ownerships, we produce the above regressions on private firm sample and report the results in column 4 to 8 in table 2. Only the Wooldridge and ACF TFP have significant positive effects on leverage, and it is evident that these results are not subject to firms' ownership influence.
Other variables are all reasonable and remarkably consistent between the whole and private samples. The lagged leverage variable has a large positive and significant coefficient suggesting an obvious dynamic behaviour. The effect of firm size is not totally clear as suggested by different regressions. While large firms may be able to borrow more since they are less likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems, they may also be more selfsufficient and rely less on external borrowing. Fixed asset growth has negative significant effects on leverage, which is consistent with the prediction of agency theory, where high growth firms prefer to reduce leverage to control for agency cost associated with managers' misbehaviour arising from the growth opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Tangibility also plays a significant positive role in determining leverage, as tangible assets could serve as collateral for external finance. Profitability has a negative but insignificant effect, which is likely that profitable firms find it cheaper to use their internal finance from their retained earnings. Depreciation ratio, to control the possibility that firms may depreciate their assets to shield off some tax instead of using debt for the same purpose, also reduces leverage as expected.
m3 and Hansen tests show all of our system GMM regressions are appropriate. Overall, we find some positive effects of productivity on firms' leverage.
Productivity effects on firms' new issue of equity
Though according to the pecking order theory equity finance may be less favoured than debt finance by firms since issuing new equity is more costly, our sample firms on average have a total shareholders' equity to total assets ratio of 41.3%, whereas their average total outstanding long term debt to total assets ratio is only 5.4%. As shown in table 1 new issue of equity ratio is higher than long term debt ratio for every category of firms. It seems that equity finance is a highly important form of external finance for Chinese listed firms. Therefore, it is vital for us to explore how productivity affect different types of external finance.
In Table 3 we find highly significant and positive productivity effects for firms' new equity in all the regressions, suggesting high productivity helps firms to raise more equity finance. Comparing with table 2, the coefficients of some of the control variables have opposite signs, i.e. the lagged new equity variable, ROA and depreciation ratio, but are still all reasonable. The lagged new equity variable is negative and significant in all the regressions, which suggests a correction behaviour of firms' new equity issues, as firms often wish to maintain a smooth stream of new equity issuance (Bolton, et al., 2013 While depreciation is an alternative tax shield substituting for debt, it reduces retained earnings and induces firms to issue equity. Again, the private firm sample has highly consistent results as the whole sample, and all the tests show our regressions are appropriate. We seem to find strong evidence that equity finance goes to the more productive firms.
Productivity effects on firms' long term debt
We then further explore the effect of productivity on another major form of external finance, long term debt, which is defined as firms' borrowing from banks or other financial institutions with a maturity over a year. Such long term debt would be costly for firms to obtain. In our sample, figures in table 1 show that long term debt is only about 10% of firms' total liabilities 12 on average for all categories of firms. On the other hand, short term finance such as trade credit and overdraft credit lines would be relatively easy to get and do not necessarily involve borrowers' particular effort for each borrowing. Thus, it is important to check firms' long term debt without the influence of other forms of more easily accessible short term finance. Table 4 shows the effects of productivity on firms' long term debt. Only LP TFP and labour productivity models for the whole sample, and ACF TFP and labour productivity models for the private sample show positive significant productivity effects. All other control variables show sensible and consistent results in both samples. All the tests suggest our regression models are appropriate. Overall, our results suggest that productivity helps firms to raise long term debt to some extent, but the effect is not as strong as the one on firms' new equity finance.
In general, we find that productivity does help firms to raise external finance, especially new equity finance, but the effect is slightly weaker on leverage and long term debt.
Does the productivity effect vary?
12 We use the long term debt ratio in the 3 rd row to divide the leverage in the 1 st row to calculate the relative size of long term debt to total liabilities. Now we try to explore in more details whether the productivity and external finance nexus differ along some dimensions of firm characteristics. First, we split our sample firms by their size and age together. Firms, which are both in the lower half of the distribution of real sales and age of all the firms in the same year and same industry, are classified as small young firms.
They are more likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems in the financial markets and have more difficulty in obtaining external finance. Small young firms in our sample indeed have less external finance, and lower values in performance indicators than others as shown in table 1.
Then we also split our sample into exporters and non-exporter. Many foreign invested manufacturing firms in low labour cost countries are established with the sole purpose of exporting their products back to foreign markets, which suggest that these firms may not necessarily have better quality than their domestic counterparts. However, we do not have such concern, since 95.75% of our sample firms are domestic firms 13 , i.e. exporters in our sample are most likely to be the genuine productive exporters as Melitz (2003) TFP regressions in column 6 and 7. These results are much in line with the whole sample results in table 2. Labour productivity has no effect on leverage for any of the firm groups. All the tests show that our regressions are reasonable, and control variables in all the regressions are sensible too. Overall we see some weak evidence that it is the better quality firm groups being able to utilise TFP to increase leverage, and labour productivity does not seem to help. Table 6 shows the sample splitting tests of TFP and labour productivity on firms' new equity. All groups of firms attract positive and highly significant productivity effects on new equity. It is the big and/or old firms and exporters always have stronger effects than their respective counterparts, as shown by the significant χ 2 tests for all the regressions. The results are persistent and robust. Again, all the tests indicate appropriate regressions. Therefore, we may be quite confident to summarise that productivity does help firms to raise new equity 13 More details of the ownership structure of our sample firm-years can be found in table A3 in the appendix.
finance. Big and/or old firms and exporters are able to better utilise productivity to issue more new equities than small young firms and non-exporters respectively.
Finally, table 7 shows the test results of productivity on firms' long term debt ratio. All measures of TFP do not seem to have any effect on firms' long term debt borrowing for all the groups. However, column 4 does show that big and/or old firms have a significantly higher labour productivity effect on long term debt than small young firms. Column 8 shows that labour productivity helps both exporter and non-exporters to raise long term debt, though the effects are similar. Again, all of our control variables are reasonable and regression models are all appropriate.
Exogenous policy shock
Despite the advantage of system GMM estimator in controlling endogeneity problems in our models, we make use of an exogenous industrial policy shock on productivity of firms in some sectors and use a difference-in-difference (DID hereafter) approach to shed some further lights on the causality between productivity and external finance.
The Chinese policy makers believe that some industrial sectors have produced far more than the demand of the market, and have been trying to intervene in the production market. The Following Ding et al. (2018) we use a DID approach to explore the effects of such exogenous shock on firms' external finance by estimating the following equation 
β is the difference between the treatment and non-treatment groups during the pre-policy period,
i.e. 2009 and before, and γ is the change after the implementation of the policy for the nontreatment group. More specifically,
The results of the DID regressions in eq. (3) are reported in table 8. Before the policy shock, firms in the treatment sectors have 4.1% and 2.7% (β) higher leverage and long term 14 In our sample the treatment group includes firms in the following industries: cement and asbestine cement products; coking; metal products; paper making and paper products; production of leather, fur down and related products; smelting and pressing of ferrous metals; smelting and pressing of nonferrous metal; and textile. 15 According to the Notice the only exception is the cement sector, which was allowed to comply with the new regulation by the end of 2012. However, the proportion of cement firms in our sample is small and it is more reasonable to use 2010 and 2011 as the treatment period. debt respectively, but 2.4% less new equity comparing to firms in other sectors. The policy shock has a particularly significant negative effect on firms' long term debt, which is reduced by 2.6% (γ + θ) in those treatment industries compared to the pre-policy period. The reduction is also 1.7% (θ) more than firms in other non-treatment industries. However, the treatment effect for the total leverage and new equity is not particularly obvious.
We then split our sample into small young firms versus other firms and exporters versus non-exporters, and run the regressions for each type of external finance. The results are presented in table 9. The policy shock does not have a significant treatment effect (θ) on leverage for all the sub-groups as shown in column 1 and 2. In the new equity regressions in column 3 and 4, large and/or old firms have a strong treatment effect, whereas small young firms do not. In panel B, neither exporters nor non-exporters have any significant treatment effects. In column 5 and 6, large and/or old firms have a significant negative treatment effect on long term debt, whereas small young firms do not. Exporters have a significant negative treatment effect on long term debt, whereas non-exporters do not. These results are consistent with our GMM regression results, i.e. the external finance of large and/or old firms and exporters is more responsive to their productivity.
Overall, our DID results have confirmed the causality from productivity to external finance, and provide additional support for the validity of our main GMM regression results. In particular, we find this productivity-damaging policy significantly reduces external finance for firms in the affected industries relative to other firms. Such effects do exist for the better quality large and/old firms and exporters, but not for their respective counterparts.
Conclusion
Using a panel of 1591 Chinese listed manufacturing firms between year 2003-2016 we find that productivity measured by three TFP estimation methods and labour productivity is statistically and economically important and positive in determining firms' external finance, i.e. total leverage, new issue of equity and long term debt. We find strong and robust results that productivity is helpful for firms to raise new equity finance, but some weaker results for total leverage and long term debt. Such results hold for both the whole sample and private firms separately. Our findings are sensible that external lenders would be most interested in firms' ability in repaying debt, and less interested in how efficient firms are. On the other hand, equity investors would be most interested in firms' long-term operation as productive firms are more likely to give them better return in the long run. Therefore, productivity that indicates firms' overall quality would matter more for equity investors and perhaps less for debt lenders as our results show.
We also find that large and/or old firms and exporting firms are able to make better use of their productivity to gain external finance than their respective counterparts, i.e. small young firms and non-exporting firms. Again, the results are mainly valid for new equity finance, but not quite for total leverage and long term debt. Large and/or old firms are less likely to suffer from information asymmetry problems, and are often perceived to have better quality than small young firms by outsiders. Exporters are also more likely to be the better firms than nonexporters given the fact that they can afford the substantial sunk cost of exporting. Thus, our results also suggest that better firms are able to utilise productivity more to gain external finance.
We further confirm the causality of our results by using DID regressions following an exogenous industrial policy shock during year 2010-2011. We find that this productivitydamaging policy indeed reduces external finance for firms in the affected industries.
Our research suggests a highly important relationship in the financial market, i.e.
despite the presence of information asymmetry, productive good firms do get more external finance. This is an encouraging discovery of a possible virtuous circle between productivity and finance. In addition our sample splitting test results give a further important implication that productivity not only enables all firms to raise external finance, the mechanism also forces financial resources to shift towards the better quality firms and away from unproductive firms.
Overall, our findings suggest that productivity is a good indicator of firms' quality in the financial market, which could possibly reduce the information asymmetry problem to some extent. If government policies and regulations may target at channelling financial resources to productive firms, it will contribute to improve aggregate productivity and is certainly beneficial to an economy's sustainable growth in the long term. Such mechanism would also contribute to a more sustainable financial system itself, given that lenders and investors may find their funds exposed to less risk in the hands of truly good quality firms. A well-functioning financial market, even if it is frictional and costly for firms to access, always generates a welfare gain. This is however beyond the scope of this paper, and can be proved in a future study.
A.1. Panel data structure Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method with the revenue function, applied separately to each 2-digit industrial group. The levpet Stata command was used in estimation. Also see Chen and Guariglia (2011) . Labour productivity: real sales / number of employee Sales: operational revenue Leverage: total liabilities / total assets New equity: [(change of total shareholders' equity from year t-1 to t) -(change of retained earnings from t-1 to t)] / total assets at t-1. This definition follows Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) . Long term debt: firms' outstanding long term debt with maturity over 12 months / total assets Asset growth: change of the logarithm of net fixed assets from t-1 to t Tangibility: total tangible assets / total assets Roa: net profit / total assets Depreciation: depreciation of fixed assets, oil and gas assets and bearer biological assets Labour intensity: cash paid to and on behalf of employees, including pay to retired staff / operational revenue Liquidity: (current assets -current liabilities) / total assets Coverage ratio: net profit / current liabilities Deflators: taken from the China Statistical Yearbook (various issues), which are published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The provincial capital goods deflator was used to deflate the capital stock, and the provincial producer price indices (PPI) for manufactured goods to deflate other variables, e.g. sales. Notes: p * is firms' surviving productivity, and p e is the minimum level of productivity when firms may start to raise external finance. Notes: The table reports sample means. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 1 per cent tails of the distribution of each variable in the table have been winsorised. Leverage is firms' total liability to total assets ratio; new equity, firms' ratio of (changes in total shareholder's equity -changes in retained earnings) / total assets; long term debt, firms' outstanding long term debt to total assets ratio; long term debt dummy equals 1 if firm i has positive long term debt in year t, and 0 otherwise; logtfp, logarithm of firm's total factor productivity; loglp, logarithm of real sales per employee; logS, logarithm of real sales; asset growth, the difference of logarithms of firms' real net fixed assets from time t-1 to t; tangibility, total tangible assets / total assets; roa, firm's return on assets = net profit / total assets; depreciation, depreciation / total assets; labour intensity = total wage bill / sales; liquidity, (current assets -current liabilities) / total assets; coverage ratio, net profit to current liabilities ratio. The currency unit is RMB yuan (the average exchange rate is approximately of USD: RMB = 1:6.3). See the Appendix for precise definitions of all variables. Diff. reports the p-values of the t test statistics for the equality of means. Private firms are defined according to firms' ultimate controlling shareholders. A firm is defined as small and young if its real sales is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the real sales distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry and in the same year, and if its age is ranked in the bottom 50 percentile of the age distribution of all firms in the same 2-digit industry. Firm is defined an exporter if it has positive overseas sales in year t. IVs (lags) Notes: All specifications were estimated using system GMM estimators. i indexes firms; and t, time. All the regressions include year dummies, industry dummies which are at 2 digit level, and province dummies which indicate the location of firms' headquarter. The whole sample regressions also include ownership dummies. The figures reported in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. m3 are tests for third-order serial correlations in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. J tests show the validity of the instrument sets. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Also see Notes to Table 1 . IVs (lags) Notes: The table reports the OLS results of the difference-in-difference estimation in eq. (3). The standard errors of estimated coefficients are reported in the parentheses. Treatt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is in one of the following manufacturing industries: cement and asbestine cement products; coking; metal products; paper making and paper products; production of leather, fur, down and related products; smelting and pressing of ferrous metals; smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals; and textile, and 0 otherwise. Postpolicyt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is in year 2012 to 2016, and 0 otherwise. Ownership dummies and province dummies are included in all the regressions. 
